The Coup’s Lesson Is That Russia Has Reached a Dead End
An indifferent response to a warlords march on Moscow heralds the dawning realization that Russia has no good way out in Ukraine. Updated at 1:07 p.m. ET on June 30, 2023. Yevgeny Prigozhin had his reasons for launching a mutiny over the weekend. Russias military leadershipincluding Generals Valery Gerasimov and Sergei Shoiguhad made a bid to subordinate Prigozhins mercenary army to their command. The extremely hierarchical, martinet culture of the regular army surely clashed with the efficiency-oriented, entrepreneurial culture of the Wagner paramilitary group, whose motto was Death is our business, and the business is going well. But Prigozhins message, which he delivered in a 30-minute speech on Friday, was not just about his personal grievances, or even just about the prosecution of the war. It was also political, and full of contradictions. The mercenary leader accused the military leadership of poor planning, which had led to the betrayal and sacrifice of Russian soldiers, and at the same time, he challenged the very rationale behind the war in Ukraine. He called for a more organizedand more brutalfight, but also claimed that the entire conflict was the result of Russian President Vladimir Putins hubris, because Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had been open to negotiations at the start. He assumed a threatening posture toward Ukraine, but spoke respectfully of that countrys military and political leadership. At one point, Prigozhin called the Russian leadership mentally sick scumbags and wankers for deciding to throw yet another several thousand Russian guys into the meat grinder to croak like dogs. Then, shockingly, he added, But that can be a legitimate option too. Sometimes, it is reasonable to act like that. For all the inconsistencies, Prigozhins speech carried an overarching message that was entirely clear: Putin fails to execute his own plans. His system is so inefficient that it cannot win the war it started, and it failed to achieve its goals through diplomacy as well. No matter what the aims are, they should be carried out. Anne Applebaum: Putin is caught in his own trap Prigozhins statements can seem chaotic, but they are not improvisations. Rather, the mercenary warlord commands a team of spin doctors and speechwriters that has been running political campaigns in Russia for years. His appeals to various discontented constituencies, from military hawks to anti-war pragmatists, are based on a careful analysis of the tendencies and moods in Russian society. And that analysis yields a singular conclusion: More and more Russians feel that the country has reached a dead end. In Ukraine, no visible path leads to a Russian victory. Putin keeps inventing stories about how Russia will inevitably prevail: First, it was supposed to win easily by removing the government in Kyiv, then by seizing the Donbas, then by destroying Ukraines crucial infrastructure, then by freezing Europeans last winter, then by waiting until the West grew tired of supplying Ukraine with weapons. Many in Russia were once willing to believe Putins fairy tales, but few can now pretend to believe that a good end is in sight. Rather, a defeat is looming, and even though the word is virtually prohibited for public use, it comes up more and more often in private conversations. In his public appearance during the mutiny, Putin finally hinted at the real possibility of a defeat, openly invoking the dagger in the back metaphor that was used to fuel resentment in Germany after it lost in World War I. Many Russian elites have anticipated the Ukrainian counteroffensive with great anxiety, as it would put to the test their apprehension of a looming rout. Putin was aware of those stakes, which was why, when the counteroffensive turned out to be underwhelming in its initial stages, he rushed to call it a failure. Prigozhin is speaking to the same frightened elites when he publicly overestimates Ukrainian gains and paints a bleak picture for Russia. Remarkably, when Prigozhin launched his mutiny, he faced little resistance from the elites, who remained mostly silent for almost a full day. After Putin addressed the public, a flurry of supporting statements from officials followed in a matter of minutes, seemingly more an orchestrated performance than an expression of genuine sentiment. The officials did not follow their statements with actions, and Prigozhins convoy proceeded toward Russias capital without meeting much resistance from the the military, either. Elliot Ackerman: Prigozhins loss is Ukraines gain What about the Russian people? Maybe the elites and even some of the military brass were sitting on the fence, but opinion polls have long confidently indicated that ordinary Russians stand firmly behind their president. Last Saturday, however, the majority of Russians apparently chose to disengage from the unfolding drama. In most parts of the country, life continued as usual, with students attending their graduation ceremonies, seemingly indifferent to some sort of war somewhere in Moscow, as one graduate in St. Petersburg put it to a Russian journalist. In the cities directly affected by the mutiny, the attitude was hardly different. People carelessly walked past the military headquarters in Rostov-on-Don occupied by the Wagner troops, even after a blast happened there, fortunately killing no one. Among those who did show interest were some passersby who demonstrated enthusiasm for the Wagner troops arrival in the film clips that circulated on social media. Except for one minor scuffle on the streets of Rostov-on-Don, there were no reports of people rushing out to save the president, or stop the mutineers, or even let them know they were unwelcome. In Moscow, where I was that Saturday afternoon, the city streets were eerily empty, though no curfew or evacuation had been declared. On a public bus, I overheard conversations that mentioned the mutiny, but not with strong emotion. Muscovites seemed calm, as if such a thing had long been bound to happen and would be greeted with indifference. I had lunch with a military expert that day. He told me that three divisions were in principle tasked with defending Moscow, but he was far from certain that they would obey the orders. Short of that, he reckoned that the Wagner troops would meet no resistance on their way to the capital. A bridge across the Oka River had evidently been prepared for destruction if a natural barrier was needed, and a few military vehicles patrolled the city. But Moscow did not look at all likely to withstand an assault. Was Putin deliberately refraining from taking military action? Not exactly: The Russian air force consistently (and unsuccessfully) attacked the Wagner convoy, which shot down several helicopters and planes, killing their pilots. There seemed to be neither an order to stand by, nor one to intervene, nor any order at all. The government fled to the north, while many rich people headed south, to Turkey or Dubai. Read: The coup is over, but Putin is in trouble Prigozhins aborted march on Moscow made clear that Putin was no longer the arbiter of a conflict among warlords: He was himself part of the conflict, which was why not he but Belaruss president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, served as its mediator. And although the two forces at odds on Saturday could hardly be classified as supporters versus opponents of the war in Ukraine, the deeper import of their standoff is the unspoken acknowledgment that the invasion, and with it Russia, has reached a dead end. Nobody has a working plan, all responsibility is delegated, and the president keeps doing what is clearly not working, while his power gradually erodes. Russia is reckoning with the fact that it cannot continue like this. Today this recognition enters Russia through the loathsome figure of Yevgeny Prigozhin. But the Wagner Group leaders uncanny crusade is probably a sign of things to come. Russia needs a way out of the impasse, and Putin is unlikely to offer one. Even getting rid of Prigozhin will not change this basic fact. His march may be the last call to start the search for a way out. This article previously misstated the name of the Oka River.